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的代理问题（Jensen 和 Meckling，1976；Fama 和 Jensen，1983)转向大股东（控
股股东）由于追求控制权私利从而侵害外部分散小股东的代理问题。那么，在中
国这个投资者法律保护体制较比较弱的国家里，控股股东究竟起到什么作用呢？
本文以 2001-2004 年在深沪交易所上市的 2439 个非金融行业公司的公司-年份观








控制小股东结构（Controlling Minority Shareholders Structure）的代理成本 大，
绝对控股结构（Super-majority Structure）的代理成本 小。另外在区分 终控制
人类型后，政府控股比家族和其它类型控股的公司的代理成本更大。 



































More extant literature shows that outside U.S.and UK，the ownership structure of 
other countries in the world is much more concentrated，and the presence of large 
shareholders is prevalent (Shen, 2005). And it contradicts with the description of 
separation of ownership and control in modern corporations as described by Berle and 
Means (1932). Thus the focus of corporate governance has shifted from the classical 
owner-manager agency problem that stems from the diffuse ownership (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen,1983) to the agency problem that larger 
shareholders’ (sometimes referring to controlling shareholders) expropriation of 
minority shareholders owing to larger shareholders’incentive to pursue private 
benefits of control at the cost of minority shareholders. So what role do the large 
shareholders play in china which is often condemned to be in such a weak legal 
shareholder protection institution? This paper covers a sample of 2439 firm-year 
observation of non-financial listed companies from 2001 to 2004 in Shenzhen and 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. We use selling, general and administration ratio (SG&A) 
and Tobin’s Q to proxy for the classical agency costs between owners and managers 
and the recent much-talked agency costs between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders, and empirically investigate the effect of the presence of 
controlling shareholders and its ultimate ownership identity, together with its 
involvement in the management on the two agency costs. The empirical results reveal 
that the prevalence of controlling shareholders does not effectively monitor and 
promote the managers thus leading to mitigate “agency costs Ⅰ” , on the contrary its 
involvement in managers and collusion with them actually accentuates the agency 
conflict thus deteriorates “agency costs Ⅱ” . In addition, the evidence supports the 
conclusion that the presence of controlling shareholders is more detrimental to the 
shareholder value. We define the percentage of value discount of firms with 
controlling shareholder by comparison with firms without controlling shareholder as 
agency costs of controlling shareholder. The agency costs of controlling shareholder 
averages 9%-12%. And the agency cost of the controlling mechanism with controlling 













shareholder structure(SMSs).After differentiating the ultimate controlling types, 
evidence shows that the agency costs in State-controlled firms is much larger than that 
in family and other kinds of controlling types.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as followings: 
Chapter 1 briefly introduces the theoretical backgrounds and issues, contents and 
framework of this paper. 
Chapter 2 reviews the related literature and includes three sections. Section 1 
concentrates on the origin and evolution of agency problem, with particular focus on 
the shift from the classical agency problem depicted by the first generation corporate 
governance literature to the more recently discussed agency problem between 
concentrated larger shareholders and minority shareholders in the second generation 
corporate governance literature. Section 2 analyzes in detail the costs and benefits of 
large shareholders as it is a fundamental problem in corporate governance. Section 3 
reviews the related research and empirical findings in China. 
Chapter 3 introduces the institutional backgrounds in china and the hypothesis of 
this paper. 
Chapter 4 describes our data and definitions of variables used in the paper. 
Chapter 5 presents our main empirical results. It contains the descriptive statistics 
results, univariate and multivariate analysis. 
Chapter 6 provides our summary and conclusion of this thesis and points out the 
limitation and future direction of this study. 
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第一章  引  言 
 1
第一章  引  言 
一、研究动机与目的 
1932年，法学家Adolf C. Berle与经济学家Gardiner Means在其里程碑式著作 





























































                                                        





② Pagano 和 Roel（1998）及 Gomes（2000）对各方间的利益冲突给了详尽的理论研究。 
③ 控制权私利还可以表现为财务结构方面，如控股股东通过代理表决权争夺（proxy contest）、大宗交易（block 








































                                                        
① 参见 BerglÖf 和 Pajuste, 2003, Emerging owners, eclipsing markets? Corporate governance in central 
and eastern Europe, working paper, Stockholm School of Economics。 
② 参见 Villalonga 和 Amit, 2006, How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?, Journal 
of Financial Economics 80, 第 388 页。. 
③ 转轨国家在对国有企业进行私有化时所实施的战略措施大不相同，例如匈牙利很早就开始进行私有化，
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